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Notes
RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CONTRASTING APPLICATIONS IN
THE SECOND AND FOURTH CIRCUITS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' provides that
courts may impose sanctions upon attorneys or parties who file
pleadings, motions, or other papers that are not well grounded in
fact, are not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
modifying existing law, or are filed for any improper purpose. The
1983 amendments to Rule 11 were designed to emphasize the representations implicit in signing a pleading or other paper,2 and to
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 was amended on April 28, 1983, effective August 1, 1983. The
following text shows the additions and deletions effected by the amendments (italics
show additions; strikethroughs show deletions).
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief therc is good grund t sppot it, and that it s
d for
delay formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposedfor any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signedpromptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. or is sigzd ;ith intent to defcat th
purpose of this ruile, it ma; be .,trieke a. shaa and f&Ise andi the aetion nay
.....
d as though the p..leadig had not b... ..
.
a ;-ilf -: .la....
this rul an tt-fe ymay be sbjeeted toapprepristz d:eplinary aetien. Sii
la aet. may. be taken..
if
dal..s
.
... e
a....... ....
&
.....
Li. If a pleading, motion, or other paperis signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both,
an appropriatesanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonableexpenses incurred because of thefiling of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney'sfee.
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. By signing a pleading or other
paper, a lawyer represents that "after appropriate investigation and inquiry he [or she]
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reduce the reluctance of federal courts to impose sanctions on attorneys or parties for abusing the judicial system. 3 Good faith no
longer insulates the attorney or party from sanctions; rather, the signature on the pleading or other paper certifies that the signator has
made reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts and the law.4 Consequently, not only filings made in bad faith or for an improper purpose, but frivolous ones as well, now trigger Rule 11 sanctions.5
The amended rule expressly permits the court to impose sanctions
on its own motion6 against the attorney, the party, or both.7 Finally,
reasonably believes that a proper legal claim or defense is stated." Chu v. Griffith, 771
F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985).
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982), Rule 11 does not impose a continuing obligation
on the attorney. See infra note 89 for text of § 1927. Consequently, the Second Circuit
will not impose Rule I sanctions on an attorney for failing to withdraw a paper that
later proves groundless. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1276 (2d Cir. 1986).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's note. "Evidence shows that in practice
Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses." Id. Between 1938, when the rule
was promulgated, and 1976, the courts found Rule 11 violations in only eleven cases.
See Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

5. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The court may consider the
signator's state of mind in determining the nature or severity of the sanctions imposed.
Id.; see Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
201 (1985). The court, however, need not examine subjective intent in determining
whether a pleading or other paper was interposed for an improper purpose; such purpose may be inferred from the record and surrounding circumstances. Schwarzer, supra,
at 195; see also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing Fox v. Boucher, 794
F.2d 34, 36-38 (2d Cir. 1986)).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Compare In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986),
in which the Second Circuit made permanent an injunction requiring Martin-Trigona to
move for leave to appeal orders entered in his bankruptcy proceeding, and warned him
that it would impose monetary sanctions if he filed additional frivolous papers in the
future. Martin-Trigona, appearingpro se, had filed over 100 appeals or other petitions in
less than two years. Id. at 11. The court characterized these appeals as "generally meritless, usually vexatious and often scurrilous," id. at 10; one such paper was captioned
"Motion for Leave to Appeal Bizarre Order," id. at 11. The court relied on its inherent
power to protect its jurisdiction, and stated that:
In future cases, therefore, we will impose monetary sanctions on MartinTrigona if he files frivolous papers or proceedings. Once such a sanction is
levied, the clerk shall accept no further papers from Martin-Trigona ...until
that monetary obligation is satisfied .... This is the only way to make the sanction effective and protect the processes of this court from abuse.
Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Pro se parties are also subject to the requirements of Rule 11
since they sign their own pleadings and other papers. "Although the standard is the
same for unrepresented parties, . . . the court has sufficient discretion to take account of
the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 201 concurs: "[V]iolations by persons appearing pro se must be judged differently from those of lawyers."
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in contrast to the prior permissive language that the court "may"
strike the pleading or "may" discipline an attorney for violation of
the rule, Rule 11 now mandates that the courts "shall" impose appropriate sanctions when the rule is violated.' The variety of sanctions available to the courts has also been extended beyond striking
pleadings or disciplining attorneys to any appropriate sanction, including payment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.'
Since August 1, 1983, the Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Fourth Circuits' 0 have examined the propriety of imposing or declining to impose sanctions under Rule 11 in a variety of circumstances. This note will examine the standard of review, the types of
violations, the party or parties sanctioned, and the variety of sanctions imposed. In addition, some unspoken factors that may influence the courts in awarding Rule 11 sanctions will be considered.
II.

APPLICATION OF RULE

11

BY THE SECOND AND FOURTH CIRCUIT

COURTS OF APPEALS

A.

Standard of Review

The fundamental difference between the Second and Fourth
Circuits lies in their standard of review for Rule 11 sanctions. In the
Second Circuit, Judge Kaufman stated in Eastway Construction Corp. v.
City of New YorkII that:
By employing the imperative "shall," we believe the
drafters intended to stress the mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the rule. Unlike the statutory provisions that vest the district courts with
"discretion" to award fees, Rule 11 is clearly phrased as a
directive. Accordingly, where strictures of the rule have
been transgressed, it is incumbent upon the district court
to fashion proper sanctions.
A natural concomitant of a mandatory imposition of
sanctions is a broadened scope of review by the Court of
Appeals. Where the only question on appeal becomes
8. See supra note 1.
9. Id. Appropriate sanctions, other than monetary awards, might include published
or unpublished reprimands; barring an attorney from appearing for a period of time;
withdrawing leave to appear pro hac vice; referring the matter to the state bar, see
Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 201-02, 204; and ordering the attorney to take remedial
courses, to consult with skilled attorneys, or to attend court sessions, see Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
10. The Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal represent opposite poles concerning the application of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.
11. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
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whether, in fact, a pleading was groundless, we are in as
good a position to determine the answer and, thus, we
need not defer to the lower court's opinion.
At the same time, however, we note that the district
courts retain broad discretion in fashioning sanctions, and
apportioning fees between attorney and client. The commentary to Rule 11 sets forth a number of factors that will
be examined in arriving at an appropriate award and in determining by whom any costs will be borne. In reviewing
the specifics of an award of attorneys' fees, therefore, we
shall continue to adhere to the "abuse of discretion"
standard. 12
Apparently, this broad scope of review is still favored, although
in two cases the court did use the phrase "abuse of discretion" in its
opinions. In neither case, however, is it clear that the abuse of discretion standard was actually applied.
In Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schultz 3 the court affirmed an award
of attorney's fees and costs against the plaintiffs, a warehouse owner
and his lessee, who had brought a section 1983 action arising out of
a condemnation.' 4 The owner had previously released defendant
New York Dormitory Authority (NYDA) from all claims. The lessee
gave NYDA a partial release, reserving any claim for relocation
costs, but then claimed a due process violation in the state courts.
Both plaintiffs later brought the section 1983 action in federal court,
alleging due process and equal protection violations. 5
The district court found the owner's claim frivolous because he
had signed a full release. The lessee's claims were barred by res
judicata; but even if not so barred, they would have failed because
neither federal nor state law creates any right to relocation expenses. The trial court also found that the lessee failed to show any
genuine equal protection issue. Consequently, the district court im-

12. Id. at 254 n.7. Despite the length of its discussion of Rule 11, the court cited
only one case, Abraham v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Schwarzer's
article, supra note 5; and one section of a hornbook.
13. 786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986). The Eastway court apparently ignored, if it did not
expressly reject, the abuse of discretion standard that the Fourth Circuit enunciated almost five months earlier in Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th
Cir. 1984). See infra note 29 and accompanying text.

14. 786 F.2d at 490.
15. Id. at 487-88. The plaintiffs alleged that the state court's failure to grant them a

plenary hearing on the amount and manner of calculating relocation expenses denied
them their right to due process, and that the failure to treat them in the same manner as
other claimants denied them equal protection. Id. at 488.
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posed sanctions against both plaintiffs and their counsel.' 6
The court of appeals considered the appeal so frivolous that it
awarded double costs and attorney's fees to the defendant-appellees
under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,' 7 in addition to affirming the Rule 11 sanctions imposed below.' 8 In light
of the Rule 38 sanctions, it is unlikely that the court of appeals'
statement that the district court did not abuse its discretion' 9 reflects a decided change of the standard of review enunciated in
Eastway.
The only other Second Circuit case referring to "abuse of discretion" is Woodcrest Nursing Home v. Local 144,2" in which the union
sought to compel arbitration of labor disputes. 2 ' Both at trial and
on appeal, the courts agreed with the four nursing homes that the
"non-slotted" employees 2 2 in question were not subject to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, which included the right
to arbitration." The court of appeals summarily affirmed the denial
of sanctions against the union: "[W]e find no merit in [the Nursing
Homes'] contention that the district court abused its discretion in
denying their motion for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions."' 24 The
court then criticized the nursing homes' litigation tactics as "hardly
represent[ing] a model of propriety"; the nursing homes had engaged in delay tactics, and had obtained ex parte orders staying arbitration, despite the union's request to be advised of applications to
the court.2 5 Considering the brevity of the opinion and the nursing
16. Id.
17. Id.at 491. The court levied double costs against the plaintiff-appellants, and
$1,000 attorney's fees against their counsel. Rule 38 states that: "If a court of appeals
shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
18. 786 F.2d at 490.
19.
The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mapleton
[the lessee] to pay defendants' costs and attorneys' fees. The district court
probably would have erred if it had not awarded attorneys' fees to NYDA and to
Schultz under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. (emphasis in original).
20. 788 F.2d 894, 899 (2d Cir. 1986).
21. Id. at 896.
22. As defined in the collective bargaining agreement, "[silotted/regular employees
are those who fill the employment slots .... Non-slotted/replacement employees are
those persons who only substitute for slotted/regular employees during their absence
on non-working benefit days (leave, holidays, personal days or vacation)." Id.
23. Id. at 898-99.
24. Id. at 899.
25. Id.
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homes' misconduct, the court's reference to "abuse of discretion"
does not seem legally significant.
In the eight other challenges to Rule 11 sanctions in the Second
Circuit, the court did not refer to the abuse of discretion standard at
all; rather, it thoroughly and independently reviewed the record to
determine the propriety of the sanctions. 26 In that circuit, therefore, the abuse of discretion standard applies only to the specific
sanctions fashioned by the district courts;2 7 as to whether sanctions
are warranted or not, the court of appeals may independently review
the record in making its decision.
In the Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, the court of appeals
has consistently used the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing
Rule 11 sanctions. In Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.2 s the court
stated that: "While the amendment seeks to 'reduce the reluctance
of courts to impose sanctions' for abuse of process, we believe that
the district court .... which was able to judge first hand counsel's
conduct in the course of the action, should be afforded deference in
its judgment. ' 29 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
26. Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir. 1986); Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-80 (2d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d
106, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1986); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1986); Kamen v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1010-14 (2d Cir. 1986); Hansen v. PrenticeHall, Inc., 788 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341, 34445 (2d Cir. 1986); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070-72 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. E.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir.
1985). At trial, the court denied the defendant's motion for sanctions; the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 254. On remand, the district court imposed sanctions of $1,000 in
attorney's fees against the plaintiffs, out of $58,550 requested by the defendants.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 577, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
Chief Judge Weinstein's reluctance to impose sanctions is apparent from his remarks
that:
Suits of this kind should not be kept out of court by threats of sanctions
except in the clearest case of frivolousness. What lies below the surface in real
estate litigation of this type against the City is the suspicion of widespread
cronyism, favoritism and corruption....
...[B]ecause the case was brought in good faith, because of the otherwise
exemplary conduct of plaintiffs' counsel, because the pleading was only marginally frivolous, and for other reasons set forth in this opinion, attorney's fees in
the amount of $1,000 .. .against plaintiffs .. .are sufficiently punitive.
637 F. Supp. at 583, 584.
See also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1281 (district court has discretion to consider attorney's
ability to pay in assessing amount of sanctions) (dictum).
28. 750 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 1238 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note) (footnote
omitted). The plaintiff, Nelson, sought damages and injunctive relief under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), for alleged hiring discrimination by Piedmont.
The court held that the nondiscrimination provisions of the RLA clearly did not cover
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unwaveringly applied the abuse of discretion standard in six subsequent cases;3 0 in keeping with this standard, the court reversed only
one of them. 3" In contrast, the Second Circuit reversed in five out
of eleven cases.3
Should the district court's opinion be entitled to deference
from the court of appeals? The broad scope of review practiced in
the Second Circuit is more likely to ensure enforcement of the
amended rule, with its mandatory language, than is the Fourth Circuit's abuse of discretion standard. Furthermore, the latter standard may be less effective in reducing the trial courts' reluctance to
impose sanctions.3 3 On the other hand, the district court is in a betapplicants for employment. Id. at 1236-37. In affirming the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion for sanctions, however, the court stated that:
Appellant and his counsel were relying upon anti-discrimination provisions in
hiring in other labor laws that were not dissimilar in purpose and scope to the
RLA. Thus we cannot say the analogies were drawn with "no good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."
• . . The single issue posed by appellant was one of statutory construction .... Appellant's attempt to extend the coverage of the RLA by analogy to
these statutes was not frivolous in a case of first impression.
Id. at 1238 (quoting Textor v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 87 F.R.D. 751, 754
(N.D. Ill. 1980)) (citations omitted).
30. Dalton v. United States, 800 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Lawyers
Mut. Liab. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (4th Cir. 1986); Cohen v. Virginia Elec.
and Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 248 (4th Cir. 1986); LaRouche v. National Broadcasting
Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1986); Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d
165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985).
31. In Stevens a convicted armed robber sued his counsel's former partnership for
malpractice. The district court had dismissed, "misconstru[ing] the basis of his claim
against [the insurer] and [the former partner] and ignor[ing] the provisions of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 59-45, which makes all partners jointly and severally liable for the acts of the
partnership." 789 F.2d at 1060.
32. Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1986); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006
(2d Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985);
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit affirmed in
Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1986); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1986); Woodcrest Nursing Home v. Local 144, 788 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1986); Hansen
v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 788 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1986); Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schulz,
786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986); and United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1986).
33. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. LaRouche, 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986).
In this very unsatisfying case, LaRouche sued NBC and the Anti-Defamation League of
B'Nai B'Rith (ADL) for defamation arising out of two NBC broadcasts containing statements "to the effect that LaRouche believes that Jews are responsible for all the evils in
the world, that any serious investigation of the LaRouche organization by the IRS would
lead to criminal indictment, and that LaRouche once proposed the assassination of President Carter and several of his aides." Id. at 1136-37. Discovery had revealed an internal
memo of the LaRouche organization which "ordered LaRouche followers all over the
country to sue the ADL whenever possible." Id. at 1138. The district court disagreed
with the ADL that the memo was evidence of bad faith in bringing this action, and de-
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ter position to evaluate the reasonableness and propriety of the actions of parties and counsel. Until the district courts become more
comfortable imposing Rule 11 sanctions when warranted, however,
the Second Circuit's independent review standard will produce results more in line with the spirit of the 1983 amendments than will
the conservative abuse of discretion standard; at the same time, the
Second Circuit's application of the abuse of discretion standard for
the specific sanctions ordered by district courts preserves the appropriate degree of deference that should be afforded a trial court.
B.

Types of Violations

Violations of Rule 11 fall into two broad classes: (1) inadequate
prefiling inquiry into the facts or law, and (2) improper purpose,
such as harassment, unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. 4 Both classes of violations have resulted in the
imposition of sanctions in the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of
Appeals. Based on the relatively small number of cases decided to
date, the circuits appear to have developed slight differences concerning the types of violations subject to sanctions.
In the Second Circuit, the court of appeals ultimately imposed
sanctions in six cases; in each of these, the court determined that the
pleadings or motions were factually or legally insufficient. 35 Furthermore, in Fox v. Boucher 6 the court found that the plaintiff filed
papers for the sole purpose of harassment." Fox sued his former
tenant's father for prima facie tort: the defendant had allegedly injured Fox by calling him a "rich lawyer."13' The court referred to
Fox's claim as an "unfounded spite action" that was "made as part
of a conscious effort to harass appellee Boucher because Boucher's
daughter sued Fox to recover a security deposit to which she was
39
entitled under Massachusetts law."
In three Second Circuit cases, the trial court did not base Rule
11 sanctions on a finding of improper purpose. Bartel involved frivolous due process and equal protection claims arising out of a connied its motion for costs and attorney's fees. Id. The court of appeals affirmed without
discussion, stating only that it found no abuse of discretion. Id. at 1140.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
35. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1277, 1279; In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.
1986); Fox, 794 F.2d at 37; Bartel, 786 F.2d at 490; Carley, 783 F.2d at 345; Eastway, 762
F.2d at 254.
36. 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 36.
39. Id. at 38.
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demnation; 4° Eastway involved groundless civil rights and antitrust
claims; 4 1 and United States v. Carley42 involved repetitive and meritless constitutional defenses to an Internal Revenue Service order for
inspection of tax documents.43
In the Fourth Circuit, four cases resulted in the award of Rule
11 sanctions on appeal. 44 Three cases involved an improper purpose;4 5 one of these also included a finding that the claim was legally baseless. 4 6 In the fourth case, the court affirmed the
imposition of sanctions, relying solely on the grounds of inadequate
prefiling inquiry as to the law. 4 7
In Cohen v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co.4 8 the plaintiff and his attorney had decided in advance to withdraw their motion seeking
leave to amend a copyright infringement claim, if the defendant opposed the motion. 49 Because the claims asserted had a legal basis,
the court of appeals found that the attorney did not act in bad faith;
it noted, however, that the defendant went to considerable expense
in opposing the motion, and that the plaintiff could have called the
defendant informally to determine whether it would object to the
motion. 50 The court therefore ordered the plaintiff and his counsel
to pay the defendant's costs and attorney's fees. 5 '
In Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.52 the court again ordered the
plaintiff's counsel to reimburse the defendants for the needless increase in their litigation costs. 53 The plaintiff's attorney had implied
during discovery that a physician witness would testify as an expert,
40. 786 F.2d at 489-91.
41. 762 F.2d at 252, 254.
42. 783 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 343-44. Carley, a tax attorney, signed returns on which salaried employees
deducted their personal living expenses as business expenses. Id. at 341. His defenses,
raised on his own behalf and on behalf of a client in a previous appeal, included arguments that the income tax is unconstitutional. Id. at 343-44. The court of appeals referred to the appeal as "repetitive" and "utterly frivolous." Id. at 344.
44. Dalton v. United States, 800 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1986); Cohen v. Virginia
Elec. and Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 1986); Basch v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 175 (4th Cir. 1985); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.
1985).
45. Cohen, 788 F.2d at 249; Basch, 777 F.2d at 174; Chu, 771 F.2d at 81.
46. Chu, 771 F.2d at 81.
47. Dalton, 800 F.2d at 1320.
48. 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 249.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 250.
52. 777 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 174.

1987]

RULE 1 1 SANCTIONS

479

when he was actually only a fact witness; 54 the attorney failed to correct this misunderstanding, despite several opportunities to do so. 5 5
Consequently, the defendant's counsel sent a partner, rather than
an associate, to depose the physician. The defendant was thus
awarded the difference between the partner's and associate's hourly
rates, its cost in prosecuting the motion for sanctions, and also other
sanctions. 5 6
In Chu v. Griffith5 7 the plaintiff filed a section 1983 claim against
the Virginia circuit judge presiding over the plaintiff's divorce and
child custody proceedings. 5 8 Unhappy with the temporary custody
award, he brought this action in an attempt to force the judge to
recuse himself.59 As a result, sanctions were imposed against the
plaintiff's attorney and affirmed on appeal.6"
The Fourth Circuit in Dalton v. UnitedStates6 imposed sanctions
upon the plaintiff-taxpayer's attorney for filing a frivolous claim to
recover a $500 penalty. 62 On her return, the taxpayer claimed a
credit for the part of her tax that she calculated would be spent for
military defense. 6 3 On appeal,' the court pointed to the language
of the statute, its legislative history, and an earlier Fourth Circuit
case upholding the penalty under similar circumstances, in determining that "it was not reasonable [for the attorney] to believe that
the taxpayer's position was plausible." '6 5
While improper purpose commonly serves as a basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions in both circuits, the Second Circuit has shown
a greater willingness also to sanction inadequate prefiling inquiry.
The fact that all but one of the Fourth Circuit cases affirming sanctions involved an improper purpose may reflect the lingering influ54. Id. at 173-74.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 174. In addition to the monetary sanctions, the court ordered that the
physician be barred from testifying as an expert: "[P]laintiffs should be held to their
representations in the second interrogatory answer and at the deposition." Id. at 175.
57. 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985).

58. Id. at 80.
59. Id. at 81.
60. Id.

61. 800 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1986).
62. The authority for the penalty is 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (1982), which imposes a
penalty on a taxpayer who files a return that indicates on its face that the self-assessment
is substantially incorrect due to a frivolous position. 800 F.2d at 1319.
63. 800 F.2d at 1318.
64. The taxpayer appealed the judgment denying a refund of the penalty, id. at 131718, and her attorney appealed the imposition of monetary sanctions against him, id. at
1318.
65. Id. at 1319-20.
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ence of old Rule 11 and its subjective bad faith standard; however,
the recent Dalton decision may indicate a move toward enforcement
of the rule as amended.
C.

Parties Sanctioned

The Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals differ on the
issue of the persons subject to sanctions under Rule 11. In the Sec66
ond Circuit, three cases resulted in sanctions against pro se parties;
two of these pro se parties were attorneys, one a plaintiff and the
other a defendant.6 7 In Goldman v. Belden,6" Oliveri v. Thompson,69
and Bartel70 both the plaintiff and his attorney were sanctioned at
trial, v ' while in Eastway only the plaintiffs were required to pay the
defendant's attorney's fees. 72 In one case, the trial court failed to
specify whether its sanctions would apply to the party, her attorney,
or both;7 ' however, in that case, as well as in Goldman, the appellate
court reversed the award of sanctions.7 ' Finally, in Norris v. Grosvenor
Marketing Ltd.7 the Second Circuit reversed the trial court's denial
of the defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 7 6 While remanding
for the district court to exercise its discretion in fashioning sanctions, the court of appeals strongly hinted that the attorney, if not
the client as well, ought to be sanctioned.7 7
66. In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (sanctions sua sponte were
not based on Rule 11, but the case is otherwise similar to Rule 11 cases; see supra note 6);
Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d
341, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1986).
67. Fox, 794 F.2d 34 (plaintiff); Carley, 783 F.2d 341 (defendant).
68. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
70. Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schultz, 786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986).
71. Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1065, 1072 (the court of appeals reversed the imposition of
sanctions); Bartel, 786 F.2d at 487; Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1271. In Oliveri the court did not
impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, but rather assessed attorney's fees against the
criminal defendant in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The defendant did not
appeal. 803 F.2d at 1272.
72. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 584 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (on remand).
73. Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 1014; Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1052.
75. 803 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 1288.
77. Id. Each of the plaintiffs' claims involved their purported right to participate in
the continued profits of their previously owned tea distributorship. Id. at 1285. The
Second Circuit concluded that the Norrises' claims were barred both by collateral estoppel and expiration of the statutes of limitation. Id. at 1287. The court further stated
that:
Under Rule 11 sanctions must be awarded when a competent attorney could not
have formed a belief after reasonable inquiry that the claims were "warranted
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet sanctioned a pro se party. 78 In Cohen 9 both the plaintiff and his attorney
were sanctioned.8 0 In four cases, the court imposed sanctions only
on the plaintiff's counsel;8 ' one such case, however, was reversed on
appeal.8 2
Despite the relatively small number of cases that have reached

by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law." . . . It is patently clear that the Norrises had absolutely no chance of success under existing precedents, and no reasonable argument has been advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands. In
such a case, Rule 11 has been violated.
Id. at 1288 (quoting Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d
Cir. 1985)) (emphasis in original).
78. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals accords special consideration to pro se parties under certain circumstances. In Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1980), the
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a mentally ill claimant's Social Security disability claim, stating that
in view of the proffered evidence concerning Shrader's mental illness, summary
dismissal of his request for a hearing on his 1977 application on the ground
that the ex parte denial of his 1974 pro se claim is res judicata deprived him of a
property interest without due process of law.
Id. at 302.
In Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit vacated the
dismissal of the pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claim that he had been forced to take antipsychotic medication against his will while involuntarily committed to a Maryland
mental institution. Id. at 825. Johnson claimed that he was forced to take medication for
his schizophrenic condition and that he consequently suffered a number of untoward
effects. Id. at 824. The trial court found that Johnson alleged only a disagreement between himself and the defendant physician over the type of medication, and dismissed
his claim as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). 742 F.2d at 824. The appellate
court, however, vacated and remanded on the ground that the district court read Johnson's allegations too narrowly, and that the complaint did state a claim cognizable under
§ 1983. Id. at 824-25.
Instead of dismissing a claim, district courts in the Fourth Circuit must afford pro se
plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to amend the pleadings in order to name the proper
defendant, and must even advise the litigant how to determine that person if necessary.
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
Dismissal is also inappropriate if the trial court is uncertain whether a pro se plaintiff has
stated a valid claim for relief; rather, the court must either require an answer, Raines v.
United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970), or permit the plaintiff to particularize
the claim, Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965).
79. 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 250.
81. Dalton v. United States, 800 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 sanctions
for filing frivolous claim imposed on attorney only; FED. R. App. P. 38 sanctions for
frivolous appeals imposed on both attorney and taxpayer); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1059 (4th Cir. 1986); Basch v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.
1985).
82. Stevens, 789 F.2d at 1060.
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the Second and Fourth Circuits concerning Rule 11 sanctions, the
following generalizations may be made:
the Second Circuit shows little reluctance to sanction pro
se parties, whether they are attorneys or laypersons,
although the court may initially warn lay parties;"3
the Second Circuit places much of the burden of sanctions on parties, with or without their attorney's joint and
several liability; and
-

in marked contrast, the Fourth Circuit apparently holds
counsel more blameworthy than parties, and frequently imposes sanctions on counsel alone.
-

D.

Types of Sanctions Awarded

While monetary sanctions in the form of costs and reasonable
attorney's fees are most common under Rule 11, both the Second
and Fourth Circuits have discussed other forms of sanctions, such as
reprimand,8 4 injunction, 5 and other orders.8 6 Both courts recognize the broad discretion of the district courts in fashioning the type
of sanction, 7 and to date the specifics of their awards have not been
disturbed on appeal.
In addition to Rule 11 sanctions for actions at the trial court
level, both the Second and Fourth Circuits have sometimes levied
additional sanctions for frivolous appeals. Authority for sanctions at
the appellate level derives from Rule 11, Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 88 section 1927 of the Judicial Code, 9
83. E.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. Stevens, 789 F.2d at 1060 (reversing order that attorney be reprimanded in a published opinion).
85. Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d at 10, 12. For a discussion of Martin-Tigona, see supra
note 6.
86. Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 175 (4th Cir. 1985) (monetary
sanctions and order barring plaintiff's expert witness); see supra note 56.
87. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985);
Nelson v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984).
88. See supra note 17 for text.

89.
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
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and the inherent power of the court.9 ° In the Second Circuit, the
court of appeals imposed sanctions for frivolous appeals in four
cases. 9 ' The Fourth Circuit has done so in only two cases; 92 two
other appeals were deemed nonmeritorious, but not frivolous.9"
These results conform to the general impression that the Second
Circuit is much less tolerant of such abuses than is the Fourth
Circuit.
E. Other Factors Influencing the Imposition of Rule 11 Sanctions
In Woodcrest Nursing Home 4 the Second Circuit's denial of the
nursing homes' motion for sanctions against the union appears to
have been influenced by the nursing homes' own abusive litigation
tactics.9 5 Later, in Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc. 6 the court stated very
clearly that a party's behavior during the course of litigation may
foreclose any attempt to recover sanctions against its opponent.9 7
In that case, Brown brought two separate actions in New York state
court arising from her forcible expulsion from a Capitol flight. 98
Capitol removed only the second case to federal district court. 99
While the Second Circuit assumed arguendo that the plaintiff's claims
were frivolous, the court held that "in the very unique circumstances of this case, where removal effectively bifurcated what
should have been a single action and thereby increased costs for
everyone, the purposes of Rule 11 would not be served by imposition of sanctions on the plaintiff."' 0 0 Consequently, it behooves a
90. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 765 (1980).
91. In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 10-11, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (inherent power of the
court); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 38); Bartel Dental Books
Co. v. Schultz, 786 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 38; counsel brought the same
claims on appeal as those found frivolous or baseless below); United States v. Carley,
783 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 11; second appeal of a case previously affirmed
by summary order).
92. Dalton v. United States, 800 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1986) (Rule 38); Chu v.
Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (Rule 11).
93. Cohen v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249-50 (4th Cir. 1986);
Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 175 (4th Cir. 1985).
94. 788 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 899. For a description of these tactics, see supra text accompanying note
25.
96. 797 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 108.
98. Id. at 106-07.
99. Id. at 107. Capitol was represented by different counsel when the second complaint was served.
100. Id. at 108. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), is additional
authority on this point. In that case the court held that boiler-plate allegations of violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1985(3) (1982), when the plaintiff clearly does not fall into
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party to keep its own hands clean if it anticipates filing a motion for
Rule 11 sanctions at any point during the proceedings.
In LaRouche v. National BroadcastingCo. 1o the Fourth Circuit refused to reverse the district court's denial of sanctions, despite evidence of LaRouche's bad faith in suing the Anti-Defamation League
of B'Nai B'Rith (ADL).' 0 2 Although the behavior of LaRouche's organization was highly distasteful,10 3 one may speculate that the
court of appeals really believed that the $200,000 punitive damages
award to NBC was sufficient punishment. Rule 11, however, is
designed not only to punish and deter abuse of the judicial process,
but also to compensate parties who must defend themselves against
the frivolous pleading or motion. 10 4 Unfortunately, the ADL was
not so compensated.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental difference between the Second and Fourth
Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions lies in the standard of review; the Second Circuit independently reviews the record to determine the propriety of sanctions,
while the Fourth Circuit applies the abuse of discretion standard.
The Second Circuit uses the abuse of discretion standard only for
a protected class, are improper and may be subject to sanction under Rule 11. 803 F.2d
at 1280. The court stated, however, that "any technical violation of rule 11 that may
have occurred was de minimis," and that "(a]s a general principle, it would be inequitable to permit a defendant to increase the amount of attorneys' fees recoverable as a
sanction by unnecessarily defending against frivolous claims which could have been dismissed on motion without incurring the additional expense." Id.
101. 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986).
102. See supra note 33.
103. For example, during the preparation of NBC's "First Camera" story about
LaRouche in January 1984, a person from LaRouche's organization called NBC, posing
as Senator Moynihan's aide, to cancel an interview with the senator later that day; a
person posing as an NBC employee also called Senator Moynihan's office to cancel the
interview. Under the guise of reconsidering the appointment, the caller purporting to be
from Senator Moynihan's office solicited and received information from NBC concerning its contacts in the story about LaRouche. The NBC producer became suspicious and
called Senator Moynihan's office only to find that no one there had called NBC to cancel;
ultimately, the interview was held as scheduled. That same day, a release on LaRouche
letterhead appeared containing information about the NBC appointment with Moynihan. 780 F.2d at 1137. These events were the basis for NBC's successful counterclaim
for interference with business relations. Id. at 1138. Testimony at trial concerning alleged harassment of LaRouche enemies by his organization prompted one juror to request that she be excused; the presence of a sketch artist in the courtroom contributed
to the juror's fear for her life. Id. at 1140.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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the specifics of the sanctions imposed, not for determinations
whether sanctions should be awarded at all.
The different standard applied in these two courts is meaningful to parties considering the appeal of Rule 11 sanctions or the denial of sanctions; in the Second Circuit, five of eleven decisions were
reversed, whereas the Fourth Circuit reversed in only one case out
of seven, when the trial court misconstrued the legal basis of the
plaintiff's claim.' 5 The Second Circuit is also more likely to impose
sanctions for frivolous appeals, including appeals of Rule 11 orders,
than the Fourth Circuit. Monetary sanctions are most common, but
the courts in both circuits have shown a willingness to support alternative sanctions as well. The Second and Fourth Circuits differ
somewhat as to which persons are sanctioned; the Second Circuit
has already run almost the full range of possibilities, having sanctioned pro se parties, represented parties alone, and parties and their
counsel jointly and severally. The Fourth Circuit seems to favor the
fourth possibility, i.e., sanctioning counsel alone.
In general, the Second Circuit takes the mandate of the 1983
amendments to Rule 11 more seriously than the Fourth Circuit, and
the Second Circuit's commitment to stemming the tide of abuses is
clear at all levels. The reason for its more stringent enforcement of
the requirements of Rule 11, as opposed to the Fourth Circuit's continuing albeit moderate reluctance to impose sanctions, is not clear;
however, the larger caseload of the Second Circuit may explain its
apparently greater willingness to curb abuses of the judicial system.
Nonetheless, despite its smaller caseload, the Fourth Circuit ought
to hew more closely to the Second Circuit's lead: the 1983 amend06
ments to Rule 11 demand at least this much.1
MARY

D. MCCAULEY

105. In Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986),
the only case in which the Fourth Circuit reversed an order imposing or refusing to
impose sanctions, the trial court had misconstrued the legal basis of the plaintiff's claim.
Id. at 1060.
106. Perhaps the Fourth Circuit has already adopted a more aggressive stance. See,
e.g., Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing trial court's refusal to impose sanctions and stressing Rule 11 's mandatory language).

KELLEY V. R.G INDUSTRIES: WHEN HARD
CASES MAKE GOOD LAW
In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.1 the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that strict liability in tort could be imposed on manufacturers
and marketers of "Saturday Night Special" handguns. 2 The court
refused to extend strict liability to handgun manufacturers or marketers on either an abnormally dangerous activity' or product theory, 4 or a risk/utility theory.5 Instead, the court crafted a new
theory of strict liability for anyone, including manufacturers, in the
distributive chain of Saturday Night Specials. This new strict liability theory requires that the plaintiff have suffered an injury resulting
from the use of a Saturday Night Special during a criminal act.6
This note discusses the Kelley case and analyzes three possible
criticisms of the decision. 7
L

KELLEY

v. R.G. INDUSTRIES

The plaintiffs, Kelley and his wife, sued the manufacturer and
marketer of a Rohm handgun allegedly used by a robber to shoot
Kelley during an armed robbery.8 Kelley originally filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, but R.G. Industries, one of
the defendants, removed the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. 9 The district court, finding no controlling state court precedent, certified certain questions on strict liabil1. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
2. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
3. Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147.
4. Id. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
5. Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
6. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. The theory also requires that a plaintiff be an innocent victim of the criminal act. Thus, a criminal involved in the crime may not file suit
under the new cause of action. Id.
7. After the Kelley decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the case resumed in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In December 1986, while
awaiting further action in the district court, the plaintiff entered into a stipulation for
dismissal. Daily Record (Baltimore, Md.), Dec. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Despite the dismissal of the lawsuit, Kelley remains an important decision in the area of handgun manufacturer liability.
8. 304 Md. at 128-29, 497 A.2d at 1145. Kelley was employed at the grocery store
where the robbery and shooting took place.
9. Id.
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ity to the Maryland Court of Appeals.' ° After some difficulty with
the phrasing of the certified questions, the Court of Appeals narrowed the inquiry to three questions:
1. Is the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun, in
general, liable under any strict liability theory to a person
injured as a result of the criminal use of its product?
2. Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular category of small, cheap handguns, sometimes referred to as
"Saturday Night Specials," and regularly used in criminal
activity, strictly liable to a person injured by such handgun
during the course of a crime?
3. Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S,
serial number 0152662, fall within the category referred to
in question two (2)?11

10. Id. at 129-31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46. Two questions were originally certified to
the court:
"1. Is a handgun, which inflicts injury as the norm, rather than the exception, a defective or unreasonably dangerous product?
"2. Is the marketing of handguns an abnormally dangerous activity?
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where
harm is brought about by some third person or persons, over whom the
tortfeasor had no control?"
Id. at 129-30, 497 A.2d at 1145 (quoting the United States District Court).
Following oral argument, the district court withdrew the certification order and certified four new questions to the Court of Appeals. The new certification did not rephrase the first question but rephrased the other questions as follows:
"2. Is a Rohm Handgun Model RG38S, which inflicts injury as the norm
rather than the exception, a defective or unreasonably dangerous product?
"3. Is the marketing of handguns an abnormally dangerous activity? In
answering this question, it may be that the Court of Appeals of Maryland may
desire to address the following sub-questions:
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where
harm is brought about by some third person or persons over whom the
tortfeasor had no control?
"4. Is the marketing of Rohm Revolver Handguns Model RG38S an abnormally dangerous activity? In answering this question, it may be that the
Court of Appeals of Maryland may desire to address the following sub-questions:
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where
harm is brought about by some third person or persons over whom the
tortfeasor had no control?"
Id. at 130-31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46.
11. Id. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146.
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As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the certified questions
asked "whether a handgun manufacturer or marketer might be liable under some circumstances for gunshot injuries caused by the
use of one of its handguns during the commission of a crime. '"12
The Kelleys asserted that such liability should be imposed under
either of two strict liability theories. The first theory would require
that the manufacturing or marketing of handguns was an "abnormally dangerous activity." The second theory would require that
handguns were "abnormally dangerous products. '"13
A.

The Abnormally DangerousActivity Doctrine

Plaintiffs' theory that manufacturing a handgun is an abnormally dangerous activity rested on sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This theory would impose strict liability on
one engaged in an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity,
even though the person exercised extreme care and caution.' 4 The
Court of Appeals in Kelley refused to extend the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is
not an owner or occupier of land.' 5 A relationship must exist between the dangerous activity and the area where it occurs.' 6 The
court reasoned that the danger inherent in the use of a handgun in
the commission of a crime bears no relationship to any occupation
12. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
13. Id. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) states:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another, resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) attempts to define "abnormally
dangerous":
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land, or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
15. 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147 (citing Toy v. Atlantic Gulf& Pacific Co., 176
Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969);
Kirby v. Hylton, 51 Md. App. 365, 443 A.2d 640 (1982)).
16. Id.

1987]

KELLEY

v. R.G.

INDUSTRIES

489

or ownership of land. The court therefore refused to extend strict
liability to the manufacturing or marketing of handguns based on
7
the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine.'
B.

The Abnormally Dangerous Product Doctrine

The Kelleys' second argument, that a handgun is an abnormally
dangerous product,'" relied on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The essence of the abnormally dangerous product doctrine is that the vendor of an unreasonably dangerous product may
be held strictly liable for any harm caused by the product.' 9 The
doctrine explicitly requires that the product be defective when sold in
order to subject the manufacturer to section 402A liability.20 A
handgun is not defective merely because it is capable of being used
to inflict harm. 2 ' The court found that the Kelleys confused "a
product's normalfunction, which might very well be dangerous, with a
17. Id. This conclusion is in accord with other jurisdictions that have ruled on similar claims. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), rev g Richman
v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F.
Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger Industries, 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass.
1983); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293
(1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, 299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985).
For articles criticizing application of either § 519 or § 402A liability to handgun
manufacturers, see Makarevick, Manufacturer's Strict Liability for Injuries From a Well-Made
Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467 (1983); Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort
Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471 (1983);
Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912 (1984); Note, Legal Limits of
Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REV. 830
(1984). But see Note, Manufacturer's Strict Liabilityfor Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEO. L.J. 1437 (1985); Speiser, Disarmingthe Handgun Problem by Directly Suing Arms
Makers, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
18. 304 Md. at 134, 497 A.2d at 1147.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
20. Id.
21. 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
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defect in the product's design or construction." 2 Furthermore, the
application of section 402A is limited by the "consumer expectations" test to situations in which the product is more dangerous
than a consumer might reasonably expect.23 Since a consumer
would expect a gun to be dangerous, the court refused to extend
strict liability to gun manufacturers or marketers based on the abnormally dangerous product doctrine.2 4
The court also found that manufacturers of handguns could not
be held liable under the "risk/utility" test used by other courts to
determine whether a design defect exists.2 5 Under the "risk/utility"
test, "a product may . . .be found to be defective in design if the

plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused
his injury and the defendant fails to establish . . .that, on balance,

the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design."' 26 This standard, however, applies only
when something goes wrong with a product. 27 The risk/utility test
did not apply in Kelley because the gun worked precisely as intended.
C. A New Theory of Strict Liability
Thus, the court found that neither the abnormally dangerous
activity, abnormally dangerous product, nor risk/utility doctrines
supported extension of strict liability to manufacturers or marketers
of handguns. This finding left the plaintiffs without any previously
recognized theory for imposing strict liability. The court's analysis,
however, did not end there.
The court fashioned a new theory of strict liability based on legislative policy and evidence that cheap handguns have little or no
22. Id. (emphasis in original). "For a handgun to be defective, there would have to
be a problem in its manufacture or design... that would cause it to fire unexpectedly or
otherwise malfunction." Id.
23. Id. at 135-36, 497 A.2d at 1148. The "consumer expectations test" states that "a
product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978).
24. 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148. The court's refusal to extend § 402A liability
to include handguns is in accord with other jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Richman
v. Charter Arms Corp. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'don other grounds, 762 F.2d
1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 132 Ill.
App. 3d 642,477 N.E.2d
1293 (1985).
25. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
26. Id. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (1978)).
27. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
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legitimate societal purpose. Initially, the court considered Maryland's public policy 28 as expressed in the state's statutory scheme
regulating the wearing, carrying, and transportation of handguns.2 9
The policy underlying Maryland's gun control law is to reduce the
use of handguns in perpetrating crime."0 The court concluded that
the general imposition of strict liability on manufacturers or marketers of handguns, for injuries resulting from the misuse of those
handguns, would be contrary to this public policy."'
Although the court refused to extend strict liability generally, it
did recognize that public policy did not sanction the use of a limited
category of handguns, "Saturday Night Specials."3' 2 Based upon the
Gun Control Act of 1968 as and evidence presented at congressional
hearings," the court concluded that the characteristics of the Saturday Night Special make it unfit for any of the uses permitted by
Maryland gun laws.3" Furthermore, the policies of both the United
States Congress and the Maryland General Assembly reflect the
view that Saturday Night Specials have no legitimate purpose and
that, therefore, disparate treatment is warranted. 6
The characteristics of the Saturday Night Special-specifically
its poor manufacture, inaccuracy, and unreliability-make the
weapon useless for the purposes of law enforcement, sport, and
protection of persons, property, and businesses.3 7 Moreover, the
gun's short barrel, light weight, easy concealability, and low cost
make it an attractive weapon for criminal use.3 8 These characteristics led the Court of Appeals to recognize a new limited area of strict
28. Id. at 141-44, 497 A.2d at 1151-53.
29. Maryland's handgun law is codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G (1982
& Supp. 1986).
30. MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
31. 304 Md. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
32. Id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1153.

33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Act prohibits the importation into the United States of any firearm not specifically excepted. Saturday Night Specials do not meet any of the exceptions defined by the statute.
34. The court examined two congressional hearings on Saturday Night Specials:
"Saturday Night Special" Handguns: Hearingson S.2507 Before the Subcomm. to InvestigateJuvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Handgun
Control Legislation, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of CriminalLaw of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 304 Md. at 145-46 nn.9 & 10, 497 A.2d at
1153-54 nn.9 & 10. The legislative history surrounding the enactment of The Gun Control Act also received the court's attention. Id. at 147-48, 151-53, 497 A.2d at 1154-55,
1156-57.
35. 304 Md. at 153-54, 497 A.2d at 1157-58.
36. Id. at 150-54, 497 A.2d at 1156-58.
37. Id. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
38. Id. at 146, 497 A.2d at 1154.
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liability. Since the manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special ought
39
to know that the product is used primarily for criminal activity,
holding that manufacturer strictly liable to innocent persons suffering injuries from the criminal use of such weapons is appropriate.40
Further, the court explicitly extended its new strict liability theory to
the entire marketing chain. 4 '
There are at least three possible criticisms of the Kelley decision.
First, by extending strict liability in this manner, the court is interfering in the legislative domain. Second, the court fails to establish a
clear definition of "Saturday Night Special." Third, the Kelley decision violates the second amendment's guarantee of the people's
right to keep and bear arms.4 2
II.

LEGISLATIVE V. JUDICIAL FUNCTION

One may contend that Kelley is no more than a judicial attempt
to ban handguns-arguably a legislative function. The allegation
that the judiciary has infringed upon the legislative domain is commonly heard today. There can be no doubt, however, that the development of case law is a proper role for the courts. The law has
long recognized that the mere absence of precedent does not constitute sufficient reason for refusing relief to a person suffering a
wrong. 4 3 Common-law precedent often proves indeterminate. Fur39. Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
40. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. The court could find no other jurisdiction that
distinguished Saturday Night Specials from other guns, but drew an analogy to the decision in Moning v. Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977). In Moning a child was
injured by a pellet propelled from a playmate's slingshot. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed a directed verdict for the manufacturer. The court concluded that the
manufacturer could be held liable for marketing the slingshot directly to children because a child's misuse was foreseeable. However, see Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc.,
62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Ct. App. 1976), in which the California Court
of Appeals, in a situation similar to Moning, declined to impose liability because it would
result in a ban by judicial fiat.
In several cases manufacturers have been held liable for failing to discourage the
foreseeable misuse of their products. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968) (manufacturer cannot claim that it is not foreseeable that its automobile may be involved in an accident); Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1963) (machine operator injured when machine attachment broke and struck operator);
Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (child died after eating furniture polish).
41. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. II, states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."
43. Seigel, Liability of Manufacturersfor the Negligent Design and Distribution of Handguns,
6 HAMLINE L. REV. 321, 324 (1983).
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thermore, judges do not view their office so narrowly as to require
only a search for and comparison of precedent.4 4 To do so would
cause the law to stagnate. The common law is not a set of final
truths, but rather a series of working hypotheses.4 5 As a result,
judges must innovate, keeping in mind moral, social, and economic
values as well as ideals of justice.4 6
The Kelley court recognized this need for innovation:
This Court has repeatedly said that "the common law is
not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to
keep pace with the world while constantly searching forjust
and fair solutions to pressing societal problems." . . . The
common law is, therefore, subject to judicial modification
in light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge. . . . Indeed, we have not hesitated to change the
common law to permit new actions or remedies where we
have concluded that such course was justified.4 7
One might argue that the Kelley court was not modifying the
common law but rather usurping a legislative function. This argument would be valid if Kelley were correctly interpreted as a judicial
attempt to ban handguns. Kelley is not such an attempt, however.
The extension of strict liability to manufacturers or marketers of
handguns is no more than a judicial allocation of the costs and
risks4" associated with a specific type of handgun-the Saturday
Night Special. Death and injury from bullet wounds are external
CoStS 49 of handgun manufacture that are imposed on handgun victims or society as a whole. The reallocation and internalization of
the costs associated with handgun use are judicial functions. By extending strict liability to the manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials, 50 the court places the burden on those manufacturers to
44. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1949).

45. Id. at 22-23.
46. Id. at 136-37.
47. 304 Md. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Ed., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)) (citations omitted).
48. The question the courts must resolve is who should bear the costs of handgun
use. Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring). In determining who should bear those costs, the court performs a risk-allocation function. If the risk is allocated to a particular industry, the industry then determines how best to spread that risk. Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or
Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 313, 316-17 (1978).
49. W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 145 (1985). "[A]n external cost
is simply a cost associated with any activity that burdens someone other than the actor."
Id.
50. The Kelley decision rests on the notion that manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials are liable for the foreseeable misuse of their product. The basis for such a finding
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determine how to pay the costs associated with those risks. 5 Put
simply, a court merely determines who should bear a certain risk
and the industry then determines how best to spread the costs of
that risk.5 2 In essence, the Kelley court simply determined who
should bear the risks and costs of manufacturing and selling Saturday Night Specials; it did not determine whether the product should
continue to be marketed.
The argument that Kelley infringes upon the legislative domain
also assumes that in a democracy all unsettled issues are resolvable
only by institutions that are politically accountable. 3 Initially, one
must note that Maryland judges are held politically accountable via
the electoral process.5 4 Secondly, no rule limits judicial review to
cases already addressed and clarified by common law or establishes
a principle that excludes wider review. 5 It is well established that
equity courts exercise broad discretion in the framing of remedies.
In developing new areas of strict liability, the Maryland Court of
Appeals exercised a long-recognized judicial power to supplement
statutory duties with those imposed by the common law. 56
The Kelley opinion is in keeping with the "grand style" of judicial decisionmaking, in which judges author opinions that depart

is that the manufacturer has a duty of reasonable care "where the injury resulting from
the unintended use was foreseeable or should have been anticipated." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Simpson Timber Co. v.
Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966)).
51. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1206 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
52. See supra note 48.
53. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 141 (1977) (questioning whether de-

mocracy requires that all unsettled issues be resolved by institutions that are politically
accountable).
54. MD. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 3, 5A.
55. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 53 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution provides

no such rule).
56. For examples of the exercise of this judicial power, see Burch v. Amsterdam
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976) (compliance with the Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not preclude a finding of negligence); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77
Ill. 2d 434, 440, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979) (federal regulations concerning railroad
cars do not preempt state tort law); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 561,
390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979) (compliance with Food & Drug Administration warning
regulations is only minimal and does not affect duties arising under common law);
Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1978) (statutes and regulations concerning the sale of drugs merely set minimum standards), cert.
denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, 28
A.D.2d 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (App. Div. 1967) (compliance with the flammability-testing method prescribed by law for pajama fabric does not preclude a conclusion
that the manufacturer was negligent).
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from precedent while retaining continuity with it. 5 7 The Court of
Appeals has not usurped legislative power but has upheld the common law tradition of responding to societal changes. In this case the
court engaged in nothing more than a reallocation of the costs associated with the widespread dissemination and use of handguns having no legitimate social purpose.
III.

DEFINING "SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL"

Another perceived problem with the Kelley decision is its treatment of the definition of a "Saturday Night Special." Rather than
articulate its own standard, the court held that the determination of
whether a handgun is a Saturday Night Special should be left to the
trier of facts.5 8 Before this determination goes to the trier of facts,
however, the trial court must first decide whether the gun possesses
sufficient characteristics of a Saturday Night Special. 5 9 Although
size and barrel length alone are not sufficient to meet this showing,6" when they are coupled with other factors there may be a sufficient basis for allowing the issue to go to the trier of facts. These
other factors include concealability, cost, quality of materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, reliability, and industry standards. 6 '
The court acknowledged that these factors are all relative.6 2 Even
so, the result is that manufacturers are left without clearly established criteria for determining whether their product subjects them
to strict liability under the court's holding.
Indeed, no clear definition of "Saturday Night Special" exists.
Typically, discussions of Saturday Night Specials describe the weapons as small, low caliber, poor quality, unreliable, highly inaccurate,
and lacking in a sporting purpose. One authority suggests a "relative attractiveness to violent criminals" test. 6 1 Implicitly this test examines two factors: price and concealability. A handgun that is both
inexpensive and easy to conceal would be considered a Saturday
Night Special.' However, the terms "inexpensive" and "easy to
57. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36, 401-03

(1960).
58. 304 Md. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1160.
59. Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
62. Id.
63. Cook, The "Saturday Night Special".- An Assessment of Alternative Definitions From A
Policy Perspective, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735, 1739 (1981).
64. Cook, supra note 63, argues that price is a consideration in determining whether
a handgun is a Saturday Night Special. Id. at 1740-41. Statistics seem to bear this out
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conceal" are also subject to varying interpretations. Thus, this test
fails to provide any objective criteria.
One possible method for defining "Saturday Night Special" is
to apply the federal government standards used to prevent importation of such weapons. In 1968 Congress passed the Gun Control
Act 6 5 that was later described as an attempt to "stop the flow of
cheap, easily concealed, dangerous weapons known in the firearms
trade and on the streets of our country as 'Saturday night specials.' ",66 In order to prevent these weapons from entering the
country, Congress authorized the Department of the Treasury to refuse import authorization for firearms that were not suitable for
sporting purposes.6 7
Even though many consumers view handguns as self-defense,
rather than sporting, weapons, the Treasury Department (Internal
Revenue Service) guidelines provide a useful classification scheme
for establishing whether a handgun is a Saturday Night Special.6 8
The system assigns each handgun points depending on the various
features of the handgun. Pistols that fail to score seventy-five points
and revolvers that fail to score forty-five points are denied importation status. The classification scheme is quite detailed and covers a
number of characteristics, including: safety features, height, weight,
69
frame construction, caliber, target sights, and target grips.
since 40% of handguns used in violent crimes are sold in retail for less than $50.00. Id.
at 1740-44.
Concealability is obviously a factor in the criminal's choice of a weapon. According
to a study conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, more than twothirds of the handguns used in violent crimes had a barrel length of three inches or less.
Id. at 1743.
65. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
66. 118 CONG. REC. 27,028 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). The court in Kelley
noted that the Preamble to the original Gun Control Act stated:
"(7) that the United States has become the dumping ground of the castoff surplus military weapons of other nations, and that the large volume of
relatively inexpensive pistols and revolvers (largely worthless for sporting purposes) imported into the United States in recent years, has contributed greatly
to lawlessness and to the Nation's law enforcement problems."
304 Md. at 150 & n.14, 497 A.2d at 1156 & n.14.
Senator Bayh's statement was made in support of the Handgun Control Act of
1972, S. 2507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill passed the Senate in 1972 but never
came to the floor of the House.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (1982).
68. See Dep't of the Treasury, Int'l Rev. Serv., Factoring Criteria for Weapons, Form
(11-99), reprinted in Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government AppropriationsFor Fiscal
1974: Hearings Before Subcomm. on the Treasury, Postal Serv., & Gen '1 Gov't Appropriations of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 671 (1973).
69. Id.
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The result of these federal factoring criteria is the exclusion of
very small handguns and handguns without safety devices from importation into the United States. Furthermore, these regulations establish clear standards for the quality of handgun construction. The
criteria give a measure of certainty to the process of classifying
handguns. Taken together, these standards are relevant measures
of handgun quality regardless of whether a handgun is used for selfdefense or sporting purposes. As such, these standards are useful as
objective criteria for determining if a handgun is a Saturday Night
Special. In future cases similar to Kelley, if the handgun qualified for
importation under the factoring criteria, the gun manufacturer
would not be held liable.
Thus, an objective system exists that may be used to determine
whether a gun is a Saturday Night Special. Future adoption of this
system or one similar to it would clarify the definitional problems
left unanswered in Kelley. In addition, the adoption of such a system
would put manufacturers and marketers of handguns on notice of
the minimum standards necessary to avoid strict liability.
IV.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Another possible criticism of Kelley is that it violates the second
amendment's guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms. Like the
legislative function argument, this argument assumes that Kelley is
an attempt to ban handguns. Debate on second amendment interpretation has focused on whether the amendment creates an individual right to bear arms or a collective right guaranteeing that a
state can organize its own militia. Analysis of second amendment
jurisprudence suggests that even if Kelley effectively banned a certain
type of handgun, this would not violate the second amendment.
In United States v. Cruikshank7 0 the United States Supreme Court
held that the second amendment was a limitation only upon Congress, not upon states or municipalities. 7 Eleven years later in
Presser v. Illinois,72 the Court reiterated the limited scope of the second amendment: "[A] conclusive answer to the contention that this
amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that
the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and
70. 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (defendant claimed municipality's attempt to prevent his possession and use of firearms violated second amendment).
71. Id. at 553.
72. 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (defendant claimed state statute that regulated the drilling
or parading of arms in public violated his second amendment right to carry arms).
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the national government and not upon that of the states." ' 3
Fifty years later, in United States v. Miller,7 4 the defendant contended that his conviction for carrying a sawed-off shotgun violated
the second amendment. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had not demonstrated that a sawed-off shotgun had any "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a wellregulated militia" and thus, no second amendment right was contravened. 75 The purpose of the second amendment, according to the
Miller court, was to assure Congress' article I power to " 'call[] forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union ....,-76 Thus, the
second amendment must be interpreted in light of this purpose.7 7
In Cases v. United States 78 the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction under the Federal Firearms Act. 79 The court
found that the right to keep and bear arms is not a right guaranteed
by the Constitution, "the only function of the Second Amendment
being to prevent the federal government and the federal government only from infringing that right."'
Only one case, Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 8 expressly analyzed a jurisdiction's ability to ban handguns. In that case, the Village of Morton Grove had passed an ordinance banning, with
limited exceptions, the possession of handguns within the village
borders.8 2 The federal district court found Presser controlling and
held that since the second amendment does not apply to the states,
it was not infringed by the village ordinance.8" The plaintiffs argued
that Presser supported their position, basing this argument on a
quote from Presser: "[T]he States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms ... ."84 The court found that the phrase

was taken out of context. The Supreme Court simply meant that
73. Id. at 265.
74. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
75. Id. at 178.
76. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
77. Id.
78. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
79. The defendant was convicted of violating a provision of the Act that prohibited a
person, convicted of a crime of violence, from possessing and transporting arms and
ammunition. Id. at 919.
80. Id. at 921.
81. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983).
82. Id. at 1171.
83. Id. at 1182.
84. Id. at 1181 (quoting Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886)).
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when required by the federal government, or absent any regulation,
an individual has a right to keep and bear arms. 5
Accordingly, Kelley does not violate the second amendment.
Under Cruikshank and Presser, the second amendment does not apply
to the states. Even using a literal interpretation of the Miller test
requiring that a weapon bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation of a militia, Kelley would not violate the amendment. The
Saturday Night Special is virtually useless for the protection of persons, property, and business because of its inaccuracy and unreliability.8 n The weapon obviously bears no relationship to the
preservation of a militia. As a result, Kelley's extension of strict liability to handgun manufacturers or marketers, even if it results in a
ban of Saturday Night Specials, does not violate the second
amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals took a bold step in Kelley. Finding established theories of strict liability inapplicable to hold a gun manufacturer liable for the use of its handgun in a criminal act, the court
created a new type of strict liability. Noting a Saturday Night Special's lack of legitimate societal purpose and a legislative policy
against such handguns, the court held that strict liability in tort may
be imposed upon the manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night
Special causing injury to an innocent victim during the course of a
crime.
This development is innovative and in keeping with the traditional role of the common-law court. The court played a risk-allocation role, not a legislative one, in the Kelley decision. The immediate
effect of this risk-allocation role will be to place the cost of a Saturday Night Special's use on those who benefit from that use. The
long-term effect of this decision may well be a better system of
handgun distribution.
However, the Kelley court did a poor job in establishing standards to help determine if a handgun is a Saturday Night Special.
One possible solution to the definition problem is the use of federal
Treasury Department regulations, which are presently used to classify handguns appropriate for importation. Finally, an analysis of sec-

85. Id. at 1182.
86. 304 Md. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
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ond amendment jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that Kelley
does not violate an individual's right to keep and bear arms.
SUSAN M. STEVENS*

* The author is a member of the class of 1986, University of Maryland School of
Law.

FORD V. FORD: A MARYLAND SLAYER'S STATUTE
IS LONG OVERDUE
In Ford v. Ford' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
Maryland's common law "slayer's rule," which bars a murderer
from sharing in the distribution of the victim's estate, does not apply
if the murderer 2is found guilty but not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.
In recently reformulating the statute governing the insanity defense,' the Maryland legislature indicated its intention to hold morally and personally accountable, though not subject to criminal
punishment, a person found guilty of murder but not criminally responsible.4 In Ford the court addressed the question of whether this

revised insanity statute would permit a person judged guilty of murder but not criminally responsible to inherit the decedent's estate
under the common law slayer's rule. The court found that, as established in Maryland case law, the slayer's rule is only invoked when
the killing is both felonious and intentional. 5 Because a person suffering a mental disorder does not act with an unfettered will, a murder caused by such a person, while it may be intentional, cannot be
considered felonious. 6 An insane murderer, therefore, has not committed the felony required for the insanity rule to come into play.7

Two justices dissented. 8 They believed that the slayer's rule
should be applied, arguing that the revised insanity statute was con1. 307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389 (1986).
2. For an interesting recent discussion of the conflict of principles that led to the
common-law slayer's rule, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 18-20 (1986).
3. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108(a) (Supp. 1986). The statute prescribes a
two-part test for insanity:
(a) Test-In general.-A defendant is not criminally respinsible for criminal

conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity:
(1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law.
4. The Governor's Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity recommended
"the adoption of this term [not criminally responsible] to make clear to the defendant,
the jury, and to society that the defendant remains morally and personally responsible
for committing criminal acts, but the State does not hold a defendant subject to criminal
punishment." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108 task force comment (Supp. 1986).

5. 307 Md. at 121, 512 A.2d at 398.
6. Id. at 123, 512 A.2d at 398.
7. Id.
8. Judge Cole wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Judge McAuliffe. Id.
at 135, 512 A.2d at 404.
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sistent with the 1983 Court of Appeals decision in Pouncey v. State.9
Pouncey stated that, under some circumstances, noncriminal collateral consequences could attach to guilty but insane verdicts. 10
I.

THE CASE

Pearl Rose Ford stabbed her mother, Muriel L. Holland, forty
times and completed the matricide by wrapping the body in plastic
garbage bags and depositing the remains in the backyard of her
home." Charged with murder, Pearl pled not guilty by reason of
insanity. The circuit court accepted this plea, stating, however, that
if Pearl were sane, sufficient evidence existed to establish her guilt. 12
Muriel Holland's will was admitted to probate in the Orphans'
Court for Anne Arundel County. The Orphans' Court, ruling that
Pearl Ford, the named beneficiary, had forfeited her entitlement to
the property by operation of the slayer's rule, declared Pearl's son,
George Benjamin Ford, Jr., the alternative beneficiary, heir of the
estate."' The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County reversed,
holding that since Pearl was criminally insane at the time of the commission of the offense, she was incapable of forming the requisite
intent for first degree murder and thus was not barred from inheriting by the slayer's rule.' 4 George Ford, Jr., then appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals; before decision by that court,
the Court of Appeals ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals first reviewed the
case law that created Maryland's slayer's rule, distilling from those
cases several fundamental principles. It next examined the origins,
development, and rationale of Maryland's criminal insanity defense.
9. 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983).
10. Id. at 270, 465 A.2d at 478.
11. 307 Md. at 107, 512 A.2d at 390. During post-trial psychiatric evaluation, Pearl
claimed that her mother had poisoned her father some forty years earlier, perhaps shedding some light on the gruesomeness of the matricide. Id. at 120 n.10, 512 A.2d at 397
n.10.
12. Id. at 117, 512 A.2d at 395. Psychiatric evaluations showed that Ford suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia and would probably never recover from her condition. Id.
at 113 n.4, 512 A.2d at 393 n.4. The mental examiners uncovered a history of mental
disorder so severe that it caused Pearl to lack the capacity either to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law, the elements of the statutory test under § 12-108. Id. at 120, n.10, 512 A.2d at 397 n.10.
During psychiatric evaluation, Pearl claimed to have been married to movie star Omar
Sharif at age seven and proclaimed herself the mother of television personality Gary
Coleman. Id.
13. Id. at 107, 512 A.2d at 390.
14. Id. at 119, 512 A.2d at 396-97.

1987]

FORD v. FORD

503

After outlining the functions of the trier of fact in the civil proceeding regarding the entitlement of the insane murderer to the victim's
estate,' 5 the court applied the principles it had articulated and
found for Pearl Ford, affirming the circuit court.
This result the court found to be in complete accord with decisions from all other jurisdictions that had addressed the issue.' 6 In
forty-four other states,' 7 slayer's statutes similar to the Maryland
rule had been adopted by legislative enactment. In sixteen of these
forty-four' 8 states the courts had construed their slayer's statutes in
regard to the killer's insanity; all of these sixteen, the court asserted,
had reached the same result-that the slayer's rule does not operate
to bar a killer who was insane when committing the homicide. 9
II.
A.

BACKGROUND LAW

The Slayer's Rule

Maryland is one of six states2 0 whose legislatures have failed to
enact legislation prohibiting murderers from inheriting from the estates of their victims.2" In the absence of a statute, Maryland courts
15. The trier of fact in the civil proceeding is to make an independent determination
of the corpus delicti of the crime; the criminal proceeding is not res judicata as to either
the character of the homicide or the mental state of the defendant. Id. at 112, 121, 512
A.2d at 393, 397. The civil proceeding need not concentrate on the degree of murder,
since both first and second degree murder are per se felonious. In the case of manslaughter, however, the civil proceeding must determine whether the manslaughter was
intentional. If it was unintentional, the slayer's rule is not applied. Id. at 121, 512 A.2d
at 397.
16. Id. at 123, 512 A.2d at 399.
17. Id. The court erroneously reported that forty-three other states have enacted
such statutes. Id. The court additionally failed to include in its count and in its appendix the statute for the District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1981).
18. 307 Md. at 127 app. B, 512 A.2d at 400 app. B. The majority failed to include
several cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the interaction between the slayer's
rule and the insanity verdict, e.g., In re Estate of Brumage, 460 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Estate of Artz v. Artz, 198 N.J. Super. 585, 487 A.2d 1294 (1985); In re
Fitzsimmons' Estate, 64 Misc. 2d 590, 315 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1970); Paul Estate, 28 Pa. D. &
C.2d 651 (1962). On the other hand, only one case, which the dissent failed to cite,
seems to support the dissent's position: Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845
(1948) (equity barred insane minor who had slain his parents from inheriting their
estate).
19. 307 Md. at 125, 512 A.2d at 399. The dissent aptly pointed out that some of the
cases were only marginally relevant. Id. at 139-40, 512 A.2d at 407 (Cole,J., dissenting).
20. The court's appendix shows that only Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, and New York have failed to adopt slayer's statutes. Id. at 12527, 512 A.2d at 399.
21. The slayer's rule has spawned a rich legacy of decisions, encompassing a wide
variety of fact patterns. When the killing is intentional, American jurisdictions unanimously reject a slayer's claim to the estate of the victim. The common law has tradition-
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have fashioned a slayer's rule, which provides that a person who kills
another may not share in the distribution of the decedent's estate
when the homicide is felonious and intentional.2 2 Pursuant to this
rule, a slayer may not inherit either by way of the intestacy statutes
or as a devisee or legatee under the victim's will. Further, a slayer
may not collect the proceeds under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life. The rule bars not only
the slayer, but all those claim23
ing through or under that slayer.
The Maryland slayer's rule has evolved through three decisions:
Price v. Hitaffer ;24 Chase v. Jenifer ;25 and Schifanelli v. Wallace.26 In
Price, decided in 1933, the court considered whether the heirs or
personal representatives of a man who murdered his spouse could
participate in the distribution of her estate. The court declined to
permit distribution, finding it inconceivable that a person should acquire by murder property that otherwise might never have come
into the slayer's possession. 27 Twenty-five years later, in 1958, the
court in Chase considered whether the rule should be extended to
cases of involuntary manslaughter. The court noted that most other
courts faced with similar fact patterns had decided that voluntary
manslaughter fell within the slayer's rule, while acts of involuntary
manslaughter did not. 28 Since the court determined that the killing
in Chase was intentional,2 9 the issue of whether the perpetrator of an
unintentional homicide could inherit from the victim remained
unresolved.
In 1974, in Schifanelli, the court addressed the effect of intent on
the slayer's rule. In that case, the representative of a deceased woman's estate appealed the award of the proceeds of an insurance
policy to the deceased woman's husband, who had been found
ally excepted the insane slayer from the rule's operation. See Annotation, Homicide as
Precluding Taking Under Will or By Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787 (1983).
22. 307 Md. at 111-12, 512 A.2d at 392-93.
23. Id.
24. 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
25. 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1958).
26. 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974).
27. 164 Md. at 514, 165 A. at 473. The Price court noted that some courts had allowed the slayer to inherit. Id. at 506, 165 A. at 471. It, however, "decline[d] to follow
the reasoning supporting any interpretation fraught with consequences so pernicious
and so abhorrent to the sense ofjustice, equity, and morality entertained by what we are
pleased to believe is the overwhelming majority of thoughtful and moral people ..
Id. at 517, 165 A. at 474.
28. 219 Md. at 568, 150 A.2d at 254. The court indicated its disenchantment with
the view expressed by some commentators that the line should be drawn between murder and manslaughter. Id.
29. Id. at 569-70, 150 A.2d at 254-55.
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guilty of manslaughter in her death.3 0 The Court of Appeals, finding that the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions allowed recovery
when the beneficiary caused the death of the insured unintentionally
or not feloniously, awarded the policy benefits to the defendant.3 '
The rule enunciated in Ford can be seen as a synthesis of the
three prior cases on the subject, i.e., a Price-Chase-Schifanellirule.32
Application of the rule to any given case requires a finding of felonious intent, and may require distinguishing between voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. Thus, when death results from accident
or even gross negligence on the part of the beneficiary, the benefici33
ary may nonetheless recover.
B.

Insanity Statute

Through most of the lifetime of the Maryland slayer's rule, the
criminal justice system adhered to the hoary M'Naghten-Spencer insanity test, a test that received its compound name from an 1888
Maryland case 34 in which the famous British rule was applied. 5
Under this test, responsibility for criminal conduct depended upon
two findings: whether the accused had mental capacity sufficient to
distinguish right from wrong, and whether the accused understood
the nature and personal consequences of the criminal acts.3 6
Although attacked several times on grounds of propriety and constitutionality,3 7 the test remained until 1967, when the Maryland legislature supplanted it with the test prescribed by the American Law
Institute (ALI).3 8 Under the ALI test, the question of insanity turns
on whether the perpetrator of a crime, as a result of mental disease
or defect, lacked substantial capacity at the time of the crime either
to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform this
conduct to the requirements of law. 3 9 The term "mental disease or
30. 271 Md. at 178, 315 A.2d at 514.
31. Id. at 188, 315 A.2d at 519.
32. 307 Md. at 111-12, 512 A.2d at 391-92. The court in fact used the hyphenated
designation. Id. at 113, 512 A.2d at 393.
33. Id. at 112, 512 A.2d at 392.
34. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888).
35. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
36. See Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 510, 200 A.2d 150, 154 (1964); Young v.
State, 14 Md. App. 538, 543, 288 A.2d 198, 202-03 (1972).
37. Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 174 A.2d 24 (1961); League v. State, 1 Md. App.
681, 232 A.2d 828 (1967).
38. 1967 Md. Laws 708. The action by the legislature represented an adoption of
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
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defect" was replaced in time by the term "mental disorder,1 4° the
last substantive change in Maryland's statute until 1984.
While under M'Naghten-Spencer mens rea could not exist without
sanity, 4 ' neither prong of the ALI insanity definition is necessarily
inconsistent with general criminal intent. 42 The volitional prong,
i.e., lack of capacity to conform one's conduct to the requirements of
law, does not even necessarily negate a person's ability to form a
specific criminal intent. 4 3 Based on these premises, the Court of
Appeals, in two cases decided after adoption of the ALI test, 44 concluded that a defendant in a criminal case could be found guilty of a
crime although insane at the time of its commission. Further, in the
second of these cases, Pouncey v. State, the court held that noncriminal collateral consequences were not in all circumstances inconsistent with guilty but insane verdicts.4 5 Responding to these
decisions, the legislature enacted new sections 12-108 and 12-109 of
the Health-General article, which taken together recognize and codify the guilty but not criminally responsible verdict.4 6
III.

ANALYSIS

The majority's reliance on Schifanelli seems misplaced, since the
Schifane1i exception turns on intent, a concept largely discarded by
the current insanity test. This is true a fortiori of many of the decisions from other jurisdictions cited by the court for support, as
these also deal with intent. 47 The difficulty, after all, that spawned
the controversy in Ford was based on the assumption that the appropriate general or specific intent to commit murder may indeed abide
within a person who is criminally insane, and that Pearl Ford had
that intent. Intent, in other words, was not at issue.
40. 1970 Md. Laws 407.
41. Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 113, 512 A.2d 389, 393 (1986); 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 74,
78-79 (1982).
42. 307 Md. at 115, 512 A.2d at 394; Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 269, 465 A.2d
475, 477; MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109 task force comment (Supp. 1986); 67
Op. Att'y Gen. at 79.
43. 307 Md. at 115, 512 A.2d at 395; § 12-109 task force comment; 67 Op. Att'y
Gen. at 79.
44. Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983); Langworthy v. State, 284
Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
45. 297 Md. at 270, 465 A.2d at 478.
46. The replacement of the terms "insanity" and "insane" with the terms "not criminally responsible" was the key change embodied in the new sections. This change responded to concerns over the apparent inconsistency between the former notion of
"insanity" and the possibility that mens rea could exist for some crimes under the ALI
test.
47. See the cases cited by the dissent, 307 Md. at 140, 512 A.2d at 407.
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A further weakness in the majority's reasoning was revealed by
the dissent's effective distinction of all of the cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by the majority to buttress its decision.4 8 Some
of these cases are distinguishable because the non-Maryland courts
viewed a finding of insanity as being tantamount to an acquittal.4 9
Other courts adhered to the M'Naghten standard that an insane person cannot have the requisite intent for a murder. 50 Some other
jurisdictions declined to apply the slayer's rule because an insane
killer could not be termed a murderer.' Yet other cases discussed
an insanity exception only in dicta, because the fact patterns did not
involve the interaction of the slayer's rule with an insane killer. 2
Thus, cases from outside Maryland provide little support for the position taken by the majority.
On the other hand, the dissent's suggestion that the legislature
intended to dispossess the criminally insane in cases applying the
slayer's rule seems unduly draconian. A balanced approach to the
problem would begin by examining how the Ford fact pattern would
have been treated in Maryland historically. 53 Before 1967, application of the M'Naghten-Spencer test to the facts in Ford would have
yielded the result that Pearl Ford, being insane, lacked the intent to
commit murder; thus, the bar erected by the slayer's rule would
have been avoided.5 4 Using the ALI standard as adopted in 1967, a
48. Id. at 139-40, 512 A.2d at 407 (Cole, J., dissenting).

49. See, e.g., Estates of Ladd, 91 Cal. App. 3d 219, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1979); Hill v.
Morris, 85 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956); In re Estate of Brummage, 460 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); In re Vadlamudi's Estate, 183 N.J. Super. 342, 443 A.2d 1113 (1982); In
re Eckhardt's Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1945).
50. See, e.g., Ladd, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 888; Turner v. Estate of
Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. App. 1983); Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78
N.W.2d 450 (1956); Kelley v. State, 105 N.H. 240, 196 A.2d 68 (1983); Estate of Artz v.
Artz, 198 NJ. Super. 585, 487 A.2d 1294 (1985); Campbell v. Ray, 102 NJ. Super. 235,
245 A.2d 761 (1968), aff'd, 107 NJ. Super. 509, 259 A.2d 473 (1969), aff'd, 56 NJ. 52,
264 A.2d 441 (1970); Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563
(1975); Simon v. Dibble, 380 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
51. See, e.g., Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 30 111. App. 2d 191, 174 N.E.2d 209 (1961);
Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938); In re Fitzsimmons, 64 Misc. 2d
622, 315 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1970); Hoffman's Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 208 (1940).
52. See, e.g., Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Strickland v.
Wysowatcky, 128 Colo. 221, 250 P.2d 199 (1952); DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 60
S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58 (1932).
53. By contrast, the Ford majority joined the case's fact pattern to the question of
whether a murder was intentional or unintentional, while the dissent concentrated on a
strict interpretation of the finding of guilty under the statute.
54. Schifanelli demonstrates that lack of intent would have permitted Ford to recover
under a M'Naghten test. Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 188, 315 A.2d 513, 519
(1974).
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finding of insanity would still have avoided the slayer's rule, since an
accused murderer would have been found not guilty by reason of
insanity. 5 By the 1980s, of course, both the legislature and the
courts had evolved a guilty but insane standard,5 6 under which a
person so convicted, although not punishable as a criminal, might
suffer many of the collateral sanctions normally associated with such
a conviction. 57 The real question in the Ford case is whether application of the slayer's rule should be one of those collateral
sanctions.
A close examination of the task force report that inspired the
1984 revision of the insanity statutes shows that the legislature
would not expand the collateral effects of the guilty but not criminally responsible verdict to encompass barring inheritance under
the slayer's rule. The present test for criminal responsibility represents an integral part of Maryland's criminal justice system and rests
squarely on the concept that punishment for wrongdoing is predicated on culpability.5" This suggests that conviction under section
12-108 precludes invoking the slayer's rule because there is no good
reason to dispossess a person who has committed a crime due to a
mental disorder.5 9 It is difficult to accept the dissent's misanthropic
view of legislative intent in light of the legislature's emphasis on improving the understanding and treatment of mental illness.6" The
55. See, e.g., Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind. App. 1983).
56. Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 269, 465 A.2d 475, 477 (1983); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 12-107 (1982).
57. Pouncey, 297 Md. at 270, 465 A.2d at 478.
58. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108 task force comment (Supp. 1986).
59. The majority rightly concluded that "permitting the insane killer to share in the
distribution of his victim's assets is consistent with the common law principle of equity
which prompted the adoption of a slayer's rule in the first place." Ford v. Ford, 307 Md.
105, 125, 512 A.2d 389, 399 (1986). The original text of the task force report explains
that " 'criminal responsibility' refers to a guilty offender's liability for committing a
crime." GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR at 24 (1983) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. It is difficult to imagine that
the task force intended for liability to attach in a concurrent civil proceeding.
60. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109 task force comment (Supp. 1986). The
task force, far from considering the insanity plea as a basis for possible civil liability,
referred to it as "a diagnostic tool to identify those who do not conform to society's laws
because of mental disorder or mental retardation rather than a criminal disposition."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at 17. The concept of guilt established by the plea is
essential to the treatment of mental illness; it is not a weapon to be wielded by an outraged judiciary:
The real context in which treatment takes place is established by the verdict, regardless of what the treating professionals attempt to convey to the defendant. What the verdict tells the defendant about himself is essential to the
integrity of treatment. Neither a guilty verdict nor a not guilty verdict is a correct statement of what transpired at trial. Either verdict contradicts the truths
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legislature simply had not manifested the hostile attitude towards
those not criminally responsible that would be necessary to adopt
the dissent's view. "Not criminally responsible" reflects a clear view
that a criminal act has been committed but the actor's mental state
mitigates against meting out punishment for the crime.
Although the dissent relies heavily on Pouncey, even that case
reserved decision on the particular collateral consequences of the
guilty but not criminally responsible conviction. 6 ' The operation of
the slayer's rule in the Ford context appears to have been one of
those collateral consequences that awaited future decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The majority was undoubtedly correct in its view that the legislature did not intend that the slayer's rule operate more severely
upon the guilty but not criminally responsible than it does on those
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.6 2 To allay all doubts, however, the legislature should enact appropriate legislation to clarify
the status of persons in Pearl Ford's position. Indeed, a Maryland
slayer's statute is long overdue and would go far to eliminate uncertainty concerning the applicability of the common law slayer's rule
to Maryland's present insanity defense. One possible approach
might be to declare that an insane slayer be prohibited by law from
inheriting from the victim unless the slayer files a complaint to determine his or her rights in civil proceedings.6" On the other hand,
that the treatment program attempts to establish. The Task Force advocates
the term "not criminally responsible" because it is a more honest description of
the defendant's situation. The individual committed a criminal act and is personally and morally responsible, but the State has determined that it cannot
morally punish the defendant.
The conceptual context in which treatment occurs is crucial to its effectiveness. A treatment program is directed at correcting a mentally ill defendant's
distorted perceptions of the world and his or her relationships with others. It
aims at teaching the individual to accept responsibility for his or her actions.
The term "not criminally responsible" and the findings established by the verdict initiate the treatment program within an honest context.
Id. at 30. Given the intent of the task force, it is incomprehensible to believe that a
treatment program would be aided by applying the slayer's rule to disinherit an insane
murderer.
61. 297 Md. at 270, 465 A.2d at 478.
62. 307 Md. at 122, 512 A.2d at 398.
63. In Ohio, a slayer found not guilty by reason of insanity suffers immediate loss of
benefits from the estate of the victim. The slayer may file a complaint to have his or her
right to inherit restored, but this restoration will not be granted if the civil court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the slayer if sane would have been
convicted in a criminal trial. The civil court has the power to judge whether the insanity
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if the dissent's view of legislative intent is correct, the legislature
might enact a slayer's statute that specifically prohibits an insane
murderer from becoming the beneficiary of the victim. 6 4 Since com-

mon-law assumptions about the slayer's statute have been brought
into serious question with the appearance of the guilty but not criminally responsible verdict, legislative action to clarify the direction
the courts should follow is appropriate.
STEPHEN J. KARINA

determination in the criminal trial will be dispositive of a restoration of the right to
inherit. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Page 1985).
64. Responding to Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. App. 1983),
the Indiana legislature enacted a statute declaring a person found guilty but mentally ill
to be a constructive trustee of any property the slayer acquired from the victim. IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (Burns 1986). As constructive trustee the slayer holds the
property for those persons who would be entitled to the property if the slayer had died
immediately before the victim. Id.

